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RELIEF UNDER THE NEW EQUAL
PROTECTION STANDARD
United States v. Board of School Commissioners1
The United States, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 brought
suit in federal district court against the Indianapolis Board of School
Commissioners, 3 alleging that the school board was racially segregating the
Indianapolis Public School District in violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 The defendants answered with a
general denial of de jure segregation, arguing that any racial imbalance
within the school district resulted primarily from residential housing pat-
terns and private choice.' The court held that the school board had failed
to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed segregation within the school
district and charged the defendants with the affirmative duty of converting
the school district to a unitary system.6 An interim desegregation plan also
was ordered involving limited reassignment of teachers and students with-
in the school district.7 The court of appeals affirmed and remanded for
further proceedings.
8
Upon remand the district court concluded that an interdistrict remedy
was necessary to effect meaningful desegregation within the Indianapolis
1. 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 800-02
(1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1970).
3. The individual school board members were also named as party defend-
ants. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D. Ind.
1971).
4. Specific allegations of unlawful racial discrimination included segregating
students on the basis of race, assigning faculty and staff on the basis of race, and
maintaining Crispus Attucks High School as a racially segregated school. Id. at 665-
70.
5. The school board also argued that its present policies were based upon
non-racial education principles and neighborhood considerations. See Marsh, The
Indianapolis Experience: The Anatomy of a Desegregation Case, 9 IND. L. REV. 897, 906
(1976).
6. Racial segregation in the Indiana public schools was required by state law
until 1949. The court concluded that this official policy of segregation had been
perpetuated by the school board subsequent to 1949 by such practices as construc-
tion of new schools, boundary changes, high school feeder patterns, optional
attendance zones, alteration in grade structures, and transportation policies. United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 670 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
7. The court also ordered the United States to join as party defendants
several suburban school districts and state officials. Id. at 679-80.
8. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
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School District, 9 and that such a remedy could be based upon the state's
ultimate responsibility for the constitutional violation of its political sub-
division, the school board. Accordingly, the court invited the Indiana
General Assembly to formulate its own desegregation plan'0 and ordered
an interim interdistrict remedy embracing several suburban school districts
outside the boundaries of the consolidated metropolitan government (Uni-
Gov). The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the
state had an affirmative duty to desegregate the Indianapolis School Dis-
trict. However, relying upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Milli-
ken v. Bradley," the court reversed that portion of the district court's order
encompassing school districts outside Uni-Gov.'2 The remainder of the
order was remanded to the district court for determination of whether the
evidence warranted an interdistrict remedy within Uni-Gov.'
3
The district court upon remand found two interdistrict violations of
the equal protection clause justifying an interdistrict remedy. First, the
state, by excluding the Indianapolis School District from the consolidation
of the suburban school districts within Uni-Gov, had perpetuated segrega-
tion within the metropolitan government. 4 Secondly, the Indianapolis
Housing Authority, as an instrumentality of the state, had perpetuated
segregation within Uni-Gov by locating low-income public housing exclu-
sively within the Indianapolis School District. 5 Accordingly, the court or-
dered the transfer of 9,525 black students from the Indianapolis School
9. The court relied heavily upon the theory that once a school district be-
comes approximately 30% black, a "tipping point" is reached whereby white flight
to the suburbs accelerates. Because the Indianapolis School District, which was 40%
black, had reached this tipping point, the court concluded that metropolitan relief
was essential. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191, 1197
(S.D. Ind. 1973). See also Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
10. The legislature declined the court's invitation. United States v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 74 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1974).
11. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
12. 503 F.2d at 86.
13. The issue upon remand was framed in terms of whether the establishment
of Uni-Gov boundaries without like reestablishment of the Indianapolis School
District's boundaries constituted an interdistrict violation of the equal protection
clause. Id. at 86.
14. Large-scale school district consolidation was effected throughout Indiana
in 1959 under the Indiana School Reorganization Act. Marion County, however,
was excepted. In 1961, special legislation was enacted which provided for automatic
extension of school district boundaries corresponding to extensions of city bound-
aries. The legislature amended this special legislation in 1969 by abolishing the
power of the Indianapolis School District to follow municipal annexations. United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd, 541
F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976).
15. The Indianapolis Housing Authority was authorized under state law to
locate public housing projects within five miles of Indianapolis School District
boundaries. Six of the ten housing projects were built on the school district bound-
ary line or within a few blocks thereof. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs,
541 F.2d 1211, 1216 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 800-02 (1977).
[Vol. 42
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District to several suburban school districts within Uni-Gov. A divided
court of appeals affirmed the interdistrict remedy, holding that the exclu-
sion of the Indianapolis School District from Uni-Gov and the location of
public housing had an interdistrict segregative effect sufficient to trigger a
heavy burden of review. Neither administrative convenience nor local
autonomy, the court concluded, was compelling justification for the dis-
criminatory state action. 6 The Supreme Court (6-3) vacated and remand-
ed the case to the court of appeals for reconsideration 7 under Washington
v. Davis'" and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp.19
One of the most intractable problems faced by the federal courts in
school desegregation litigation is designing an effective remedy to elimi-
nate de jure segregation" in large urban school districts having substantial
black enrollment.2 1 In Milliken v. Bradley22 the Supreme Court was first
faced with the validity of interdistrict relief to remedy racial segregation
found to exist only in the inner-city school district. The Court rejected the
argument that the state's overall responsibility for public education justifies
imposing a metropolitan remedy whenever necessary to effectively elimi-
nate unlawful segregation in one district. Nevertheless, the Court con-
cluded that federal courts do have the power to cross school district lines
for desegregation purposes "where there has been a constitutional viola-
tion calling for interdistrict relief." Therefore, Milliken seemed to suggest
that while the Constitution will not permit judicial interference with the
operations of local governmental entities not implicated in any unconstitu-
tional conduct, an interdistrict remedy will be permissible where state
action has been a "substantial cause of interdistrict segregation."23
In the wake of Milliken, lower federal courts explored several bases for
16. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211, 1221 (7th Cir.
1976).
17. 97 S. Ct. at 800-02.
18. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
19. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
20. De jure segregation is segregation that violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. In those states where racial segregation was required
or permitted by state law, de jure segregation exists if "all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation" have not been purged from the system, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); or if school officials have failed in their
"affirmative duty" to eliminate racial discrimination "root and branch," Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436-37 (1968). In states where segregation was
not legally sanctioned, de jure segregation requires intentional state action. Keyes v.
School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
21. Intradistrict desegregation plans often prove counter-productive in urban
core districts having a substantial number of blacks. Reassignment of blacks to the
few remaining predominantly white schools accelerates the now-familiar process of
white flight and resegregation. See Coltfelter, The Detroit Decision and "White
Flight", 5 J. LEGAL STUD., 99 (1976).
22. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
23. Id. at 744-45.
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interdistrict relief, including gerrymandering of school district lines,24
school district reorganization 25 and metropolitan consolidation 26 plans ex-
cluding urban school districts having a large percentage of blacks, and
exclusionary housing and zoning laws.27 The assumption underlying these
decisions was that state action having a substantial interdistrict segregative
effect justified imposition of an interdistrict remedy. However, the Su-
preme Court subsequently held, in Washington v. Davis,28 that official
action having disproportionate racial impact is not a denial of equal protec-
tion unless discriminatorily motivated.29 This new equal protection stand-
ard was further developed by the Court in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.30 Among the "subjects of proper
inquiry" enumerated by the Court for determining whether invidious
purpose was a motivating factor in the official action are: evidence of
disproportionate racial impact, the historical background of the action, the
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged action, any depar-
tures from normal procedure, and any legislative or administrative history.
Unless "sensitive inquiry" into these and other relevant evidentiary sources
reveals racial motive, there is no constitutional violation requiring judicial
relief.3 1
By remanding Board of School Commissioners to the court of appeals in
light of Davis and Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court in effect con-
cluded that the challenged state action was not an interdistrict violation of
the equal protection clause unless segregative motive could be demon-
strated. 32 Because Board of School Commissioners came to trial before Davis
and Arlington Heights were decided, there was no serious attempt by the
United States to prove racial motive. Nevertheless, an analysis of the facts
in the case may indicate the likelihood of obtaining an interdistrict remedy
under the new equal protection standard.
The two bases relied upon in Board of School Commissioners for interdis-
trict relief were the exception of the Indianapolis School District from
24. United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975); Evans v. Buchan-
an, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
25. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 963
(1975).
26. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 800-02 (1977); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board
of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
27. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976),
vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 800-02 (1977); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428
(D. Del.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
28. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
29. "The school desegregation cases have . . . adhered to the basic equal
protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id.
at 140.
30. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
31. Id.
32. 97 S. Ct. 800-02 (1977).
[Vol. 42
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consolidation under Uni-Gov and the location of low-income public hous-
ing exclusively within the Indianapolis School District.33 Under Davis,
neither action rises to the level of a constitutional violation unless dis-
criminatorily motivated. Absent direct evidence of invidious purpose, seg-
regative motive must be inferred by examining the factors delineated in
Arlington Heights. Evidence of disproportionate racial impact provides an
important starting point. There is little doubt from the record in Board of
School Commissioners that the Uni-Gov legislation and the location of public
housing had a substantial segregative impact. Because ninety-five percent
of the black population to be encompassed by Uni-Gov resided within the
Indianapolis School District, the exclusion of the district from Uni-Gov
effectively created a dual school system within Uni-Gov. Similarly, by
refusing to build low-income public housing, most of which would be
occupied by blacks, in the outlying suburban communities, the In-
dianapolis Housing Authority contributed to the racial disparity between
the Indianapolis School District and the suburban school districts within
Uni-Gov.
3 4
However, segregative effect alone will rarely trigger strict scrutiny of
facially neutral state action unless the effect is so overwhelming that it is
unexplainable other than on racial grounds.3 5 In Board of School Commis-
sioners the evidence reaches no such extreme. The failure to include the
Indianapolis School District in Uni-Gov is at least partially explainable in
terms of such benign concerns as administrative inconvenience, increased
property taxes, and loss of local autonomy. There is also evidence that the
public housing projects were located exclusively within the Indianapolis
School District because housing officials were unable to secure cooperative
agreements from the suburban communities as required under HUD
guidelines for federal funding." Therefore, the court should look to other
indicia of discriminatory intent.
The historical background of the official action is another important
evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a pattern of state action taken
for invidious purposes. In Board of School Commissioners, the amendment
excluding the Indianapolis School District from Uni-Gov followed a series
of attempts by state legislators representing suburban constituents to iso-
late the district.3 7 Similarly, the decision to limit public housing projects to
the Indianapolis School District was made against a historical backdrop of
33. 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 800-02
(1977).
34. Id. at 1220, 1222.
35. The Supreme Court appears to require a factual pattern as stark as those
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), in which a municipal ordinance
regulating commercial laundries was enforced exclusively against Chinese establish-
ments, and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), in which municipal bound-
aries were redrawn to exclude all but a handful of black voters. 97 S. Ct. 555, 564
(1977).
36. 541 F.2d at 1228.
37. Id. at 1217-18.
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pervasive public and private exclusionary practices which effectively dis-
couraged blacks from renting or buying suburban housing. 8 However,
neither pattern necessarily betrays racial motive." A history of exceptional
treatment for Indianapolis is not surprising in view of the unique economic
and administrative considerations which large urban areas present to state
legislatures. In addition, there is no evidence linking the public housing
decision with past discrimination by other parties. Consequently, the court
may seek more compelling evidence of segregative purpose.
A third area of inquiry is the specific sequence of events leading up to
the challenged action. There is little in the record of Board of School
Commissioners to spark suspicion other than the timing of the Uni-Gov
legislation. The amendment excepting the Indianapolis School District
from Uni-Gov was adopted after the desegregation suit was filed and a
mere sixteen days before Uni-Gov was enacted.4" While such timing may
suggest a purposeful design to avoid suburban participation in the antic-
ipated desegregation plan, a more likely explanation is a realistic political
judgment bythe legislature that suburban opposition would scuttle Uni-
Gov if the school district were not excluded.
Departures from normal procedure provide yet another source from
which to glean invidious purpose. In Board of School Commissioners there is
evidence that the factors normally considered by the legislature in deter-
mining the propriety of school district reorganizations heavily favored a
decision contrary to the one reached.4 While such a substantive departure
from normal procedure is strong evidence of racial motive, the inference is
diluted by the fact that the Indianapolis School District was just one of
many governmental units excluded from Uni-Gov. 42
Finally, any legislative or administrative history, including testimony of
the public officials involved, may be relevant evidence of discriminatory
intent. An examination of official reports in Board of School Commissioners
yielded no direct evidence of racial motive. Similarly, although several
public officials were called as witnesses by the United States, each of them
38. The discriminatory conduct included the recording of racial covenants,
discriminatory FHA loan practices, and private discrimination by brokers and
sellers. Id. at 1228 n.8.
39. The courts are more likely to infer racial motive when the challenged
action is antedated by pervasive discrimination as in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268(1939), in which a facially neutral voter registration statute had the effect of
excluding blacks who had been previously disenfranchised; or Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), in which a refusal by the county to fund the public
schools had the effect of excluding only blacks because whites were provided county
tuition grants to attend private schools.
40. 541 F.2d at 1218.
41. Id. at 1217.
42. Among the governmental units excepted from Uni-Gov were the Airport
Authority, the Health & Hospital Corp., the County Dept. of Welfare, the Building
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denied invidious motivation. Consequently, this is unlikely to be a fruitful
evidentiary source.4 3
Whether the court of appeals will conclude that the foregoing evi-
dence satisfies the new equal protection standard depends upon how
liberally the broad terms of Arlington Heights are applied.44 In making
similar determinations, the courts are likely to be influenced by two exter-
nal considerations. First, the greater the perceived need for interdistrict
relief to effectively eliminate unlawful segregation in the urban core dis-
trict, the more willing the courts may be to find the requisite constitutional
violation.41 Secondly, although the suburban communities to be included in
the desegregation plan may not have committted constitutional violations,
the more they appear implicated in the discriminatory conduct, the more
inclined the courts may be to attribute invidious purposes to the challenged
state action.46 Both factors favor a finding of a racial motivation in Board of
School Commissioners.47
There are at least two other bases for interdistrict relief which may
hold promise under the new equal protection standard. The first, suggest-
ed in Milliken,48 is the deliberate gerrymandering of school district lines in
a discriminatory manner. Such a showing may be easier in the South,49 with
its history of state-imposed segregation, than in the North where district
lines are generally drawn for ostensibly neutral reasons. In either case,
particularly strong evidence of segregative motive would be the redrawing
of school district boundaries closely following racial shifts in residential
patterns.5" Also, the argument can be made that school reorganization and
metropolitan consolidation plans which exclude black urban school dis-
tricts are racially motivated boundary manipulations.
5 1
43. This is unlikely to be an important evidentiary source for two reasons.
First, only the most obtuse political official would make his invidious motives a
matter of public record. Secondly, the prospect of eliciting incriminating testimony
from the public officials involved is severely weakened by the doctrine of privilege.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951).
44. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
45. Although a wrong and its remedy are separate considerations in theory,
they functionally overlap. Courts generally search for an interdistrict constitutional
violation only after they have become convinced that an interdistrict remedy is
indispensable.
46. In Milliken, there was no evidence that the suburban communities had
engaged in discrimination against the urban district. To the extent that suburban
communities are implicated, although not themselves in violation of the Constitu-
tion, the courts are less likely to be deferential to local autonomy.
47. 541 F.2d at 1214.
48. 418 U.S. at 744-45.
49. See United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1016 (1972); Haney v. County Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969).
50. In large metropolitan areas, such lines may be redrawn to avoid requiring
suburban districts to accommodate the relatively few blacks residing outside the
inner city.
51. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.
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